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Abstract
The increase in spectrum demand, which has occurred internationally in
the last 10-15 years as a consequence of booming wireless communications,
has placed considerable pressure on traditional regulatory arrangements for
spectrum access and use. Regulators, especially in industrial countries, have
taken a number of steps of remedial policy vis- a-vis these diculties, by in-
creasing the share of spectrum made available for commercial use as well as
by injecting some 
exibility into command-and-control regulation. These are,
however, steps of a temporary, palliative nature and do not make for a wider
spectrum management reform. Starting from a discussion of the limitations
of command-and-control regulation, this paper deals with the two main, al-
ternative approaches which have been proposed: a (Coasian) market regime,
and a commons regime. After taking sides in favour of the market regime,
consideration is given to some implementation issues, and to a regulatory
formula|called administrative incentive pricing|which could help ensure a
smooth transition from command-and-control to market arrangements.
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1 Introduction
The increase in spectrum demand, which has occurred, internationally, in
the last 10-15 years as a consequence of booming wireless communications,
has placed considerable pressure on traditional (administrative, command-
and-control) regulatory arrangements for spectrum access and use. As two
commentators have stated recently, \today, the radio frequency spectrum
is the shared resource that perhaps most strikingly and most pervasively
aects the well being of society" (Baumol and Robyn, 2006, pp. 1-2); but
command-and-control arrangements are poorly suited to ensure ecient spec-
trum management.
While market developments produce a shifting structure of applications
and spectrum demands (Benkler, 2002; Cave, 2002; EC, 2005a; Analysys et
al., 2005; Ofcom, 2005a), the adjustment of command-and-control regulation
is hindered by uncertainty as to current and foreseeable developments|not
to mention opposition from incumbent spectrum users, who are obviously
reluctant to release spectrum bands for use by new entrants.
Governments, especially in industrial countries, have taken a number
of steps of remedial policy vis- a-vis these diculties. They have increased
the share of spectrum made available for commercial use, by releasing spec-
trum bands previously held for use by the public sector (typically, the mil-
itary); they have also injected 
exibility into command-and-control regu-
lation, by auctioning spectrum bands, allowing secondary trading (subject
to no changes in use), permitting innovative ways of commercial access to
spectrum use (e.g. airtime resale, virtual network operation) and widening
unrestricted access to spectrum bands (ITU, 2004).
These are, however, steps of a temporary, palliative nature. The reserve
of spectrum bands in the hands of the public sector is limited and shrink-
ing, as long as re-allocation measures are eected. And at the same time,

exibility measures, by addressing specic issues and spectrum bands, fall
short of giving an organic solution to the problem of spectrum management.
A smooth migration of applications across radio frequencies and implemen-
tation of new transmission technologies is not ensured; as a consequence,
inecient spectrum use is a permanent feature of the development of com-
munication systems.
These considerations lead to the theme and questions of the present paper.
While it is clear that ecient spectrum management should allow for full
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competition among users and applications (i.e. for full 
exibility in spectrum
use), it remains far from clear what arrangements could best sustain such
competition and 
exibility.
There is an apparent similarity in structure between this allocation prob-
lem and others with which economics is familiar, in a considerable number of
elds, from pollution rights to airport slots. Allocation of spectrum bands,
however, shows a distinctive feature: the solution along Coasian lines, involv-
ing property rights and market exchanges (Coase, 1959, 1960), customarily
proposed for these kinds of problems, nds considerable support (e.g., Ha-
zlett, 1998, 2003; Kwerel and Williams, 2002; Baumol and Robyn, 2006).
But, especially in the American literature, an alternative proposal has been
presented, involving the management of spectrum as a commons and limited
regulation to avoid harmful radio interference (e.g., Noam, 1998; Benkler,
2002; Werbach, 2004).
Starting from a discussion of the limitations of command-and-control reg-
ulation, this paper considers the two main, alternative approaches which
have been proposed|namely, a (Coasian) market regime, and a commons
regime, respectively; then, after taking sides in favour of the market regime,
consideration is given to some implementation issues, and to a regulatory
formula|called administrative incentive pricing|which can help ensure a
smooth transition from command-and-control to market arrangements.
2 Interference management under the command-and-control ap-
proach
Under the command-and-control approach, harmful interference is prevented
by means of regulators allocating (technologically usable and commercially
valuable) spectrum bands to users and applications. Regulators usually al-
locate licensing and exclusive rights; however, in a few cases (like CB com-
munications) allocations allow free access and joint use. As a rule, bands
are generously sized, and distanced from each other by means of cushion or
guard-bands. Finally, no signicant payment is required for access and use.
This approach has large, and well known, eciency costs (Hazlett and
Mu~ noz, 2004; Ellig, 2005). It is an inherently conservative approach, in a
rapidly shifting technological and economic situation. On the one hand, as
market signals are suppressed, regulators tend to have limited information on
the economic value of bands: their judgement on the spectrum re-allocations
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needed is thus made uncertain, and debatable. On the other hand, regula-
tors' decisions on re-allocations are constrained by the structure of histori-
cal rights-of-use: manipulation of these rights (by restricting or transferring
them, or by charging for them) is bound to be felt by incumbent operators
as unfair, being an ex-post modication of the original terms of use, and to
be strongly opposed by them.
As a result, the actual structure of spectrum use tends to be at odds with
the ecient one and falls short of the requirement that spectrum bands be
allocated to their most valuable uses.
This is not a minor problem as has been proved by the auctioning of spec-
trum bands, introduced in the United States, and later repeated in a number
of countries and widely in Europe. Such auctioning, which involved the allo-
cation of additional spectrum bands, introduced the principle that operators
should pay for spectrum use, and also showed that payments involved might
often be substantial (Prat and Valletti, 2001; Morris, 2005).
3 Spectrum scarcity or spectrum abundance?
Although the electromagnetic spectrum is boundless and radio frequencies
account for a vast bandwidth, spanning from around 3 kHz to 3000 GHz,
frequencies are not perfect substitutes: lower frequencies|particularly up to
3 GHz|are usually the most valuable ones for commercial purposes, as they
have the most suitable propagation properties for many commercial services,
in particular in terms of coverage and power requirements; thus they allow
saving on costs (Evci and Fino, 2001; Cave and Webb, 2003a). Attempts
to use higher frequencies have been made successfully (for instance, wireless
local loop licences are usually for the frequencies in the 26 GHz band and
tests in other higher bands, such as the 41 GHz band, have been considered
by the industry). But the higher costs usually involved with transmissions in
these frequencies make the use of a large part of the radio spectrum unviable:
more antennas need to be deployed, or higher power levels have to be used
for communications (hence an increase in radio frequency interference).
Therefore technology engenders absolute and relative constraints on fre-
quency exploitation. Indeed, there are radio frequencies that cannot be used
because we lack the technology to use them (i.e., frequencies above 100 GHz).
And, although, new technology is available to transmit in currently unused
bandwidth or to exploit further some bands (by means of frequency re-use),
5F. Minervini, D. Piacentino / WP n.7 DiSSE, University of Macerata
it has not become marketable yet, either because it is too expensive or it
cannot be implemented on user-friendly devices.
Radio technology is subject to rapid change, thus bringing new opportu-
nities to make more intensive and dynamic use of spectrum. As technology
has evolved, regulators have not been successful at managing spectrum by
means of the legacy formula of command and control (Faulhaber and Farber,
2002) and issues of articial scarcity have been brought about by ineective
regulation. In his independent review for the British government, Cave ar-
gues that interference management has emerged as \the key factor rendering
the radio spectrum a scarce resource" (Cave, 2002, p. 75).
Regulation can have an impact on spectrum scarcity in dierent ways.
Firstly, scarcity can result because insucient bandwidth has been made
available to particular producers of spectrum-based services. This is the
case, for instance, if parts of the radio spectrum are not allocated to any ap-
plication or if previously allocated frequencies have been handed back to the
regulator, but have not been re-allocated or re-assigned. Secondly, scarcity
can be the outcome of poorly regulated access to spectrum due to insu-
cient 
exibility in the design of licences and spectrum usage rights. In fact,
licences issued by national regulators may, for instance, include clauses that
prevent sharing of frequencies (between the licensee and other users); or sec-
ondary trading of frequencies may be void. The latter occurs usually because
command-and-control regulation struggles to accommodate trading arrange-
ments between spectrum users (Bykowsky, 2003), within a framework that
would also limit regulatory discretion to assign rights (Hazlett, 1997; Far-
quhar and Fitzgerald, 2003). Moreover, \emphasis in existing management
systems on minimising interference of all types and at all times may be cre-
ating unnecessary spectrum scarcity in the most attractive frequency bands"
(Analysys et al., 2004, p. 16), in particular by forbidding (or constrain-
ing) changes in spectrum use. Thus, valuable spectrum resources are left
idle or put in the (tied) hands of licensees by regulatory at1. But there
1Notably, in its recent design of licences for wireless broadband services in the 2010-2025
MHz band, the Australian regulator has stated that \licences are a tradable, technology-

exible spectrum access right for a xed term. This means that the licence is not limited
to any particular technology, system or service. Instead of authorising the use of a specic
radiocommunications device at a xed site, spectrum licences give licensees the freedom
to deploy devices anywhere within their licence area. However, the devices must be com-
patible with the core conditions of the licence and the technical framework for the band"
(ACMA, 2006a).
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is also another relevant way in which regulation can contribute to (arti-
cial) scarcity: regulation can inhibit the research and development of ways
to reduce scarcity2 and use the spectrum eciently.
4 Spectrum management and technological change: a conundrum
for command-and-control regulators
The command-and-control approach to spectrum regulation requires a de-
liberative process (involving study and public consultation) in order to re-
allocate the spectrum. This process is very often reliant upon consultations
initiated by regulators on specic issues and there are also instances where
the regulators decide to seek support from consultants and directly from
regulatees, sometimes joined in consortia. Regulation of new and emerging
technologies that have not yet appeared on the market is, however, a far more
burdensome and trickier issue, because regulation runs the risk of picking a
wrong option. It is crucial that regulatory decisions are made while new
technologies are in their (early) development stage and before they enter the
market for commercial deployment (Evci and Fino, 2001).
A number of new technologies have been developed recently3 and many
of them promise to enable innovative systems and applications, thus bringing
valuable goods and services along the value chain of spectrum (Cave, 2006).
However, these technologies are still mostly conned in the area of R&D and
only few prototypes or rst-generation applications have made their way onto
the market for commercial use, after many years of scrutiny and tests.
Nevertheless, under the command-and-control formula, it is the regula-
tors' task to anticipate how these technologies should be used to obtain the
greatest benets from overall spectrum exploitation. Also, new technologies
can support or require new methods for spectrum management. These tasks
imply that regulators need to be aware of emerging technologies, of their
2For instance, Faulhaber and Farber (2002) argue that, given broadcasters' abundant
swath of spectrum for analogue television, there has been a lack of incentives to deploy
better lters in television sets and, thereby, use frequencies more eciently.
3These include: multi-band OFDM, UWB, MIMO/smart antennas, metamaterial an-
tennas, software dened radios, data compression, turbo coding, interference cancellation,
mesh networks and sensors. Systems implementing these new technologies include 3G/4G
communications, WiFi and WiMax, RFID, DVB-H, Flarion, Bluetooth and sensor net-
works. Examples of applications are mobile phone calls and mobile TV, inventory tracking,
PAN, xed internet access and network backhaul.
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potential applications and evaluate whether regulatory action needs to be
undertaken.
Thus, regulators are now dealing with the issues that technological de-
velopments (such as spread spectrum technologies, dynamic spectrum access
technologies, smart antennas) are raising for spectrum management. Some
of these technologies will enable a higher level of spectrum use (e.g. ultra-
wideband), other technologies will improve the ability to transmit and receive
signals (e.g. smart antennas), and advanced software dened radio technolo-
gies might even lead to a state where regulation is no longer needed, because
cognitive radios will be able to manage communications autonomously.
But how regulation should change to accommodate these technologies re-
mains controversial. For instance, orthogonal frequency division multiplexing
(OFDM) allows spectrum sculpting and, therefore, is in principle suitable for
use as a spectrum overlay technique; multi-band OFDM (a variant of ultra-
wideband) has a spectrum sharing feature; ultra-wideband (UWB) enables
the use of spectrum below the noise-
oor; advanced antennas can increase
coverage and capacity; and nally, ad hoc mesh networks(which work by re-
lying data from node to node, rather than sending it back to a radio base
station) have a potential to carry out autonomous operations by deploying
low power devices and cognitive radio technology in the node terminal equip-
ment.
There is a number of high prole technologies and related applications
that do not give rise to regulatory concerns, either because policy implications
are now well understood (e.g. UWB) or because they are primarily a cost
saving device for network operators and have little regulatory impact (e.g.
smart antennas). Also, some applications are already well established in the
market (e.g. WiFi), whereas others are still too ill-dened and too far into
the future to call for regulatory scrutiny (e.g. 4G).
5 Spectrum regulation in Italy|A digression
The problems of command-and-control regulation are neatly illustrated by
some recent developments that have occurred in Italy: the switchover from
analogue to digital technology in TV broadcasting; the slow take-o of WiMax;
and the re-allocation of spectrum bands.
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5.1 Switch-over and digital dividend in TV broadcasting: how to
liberalise spectrum without opening markets to competition
In Italy, since long time, use of the TV broadcasting spectrum has been
characterized by features that make the Italian experience a peculiar one,
indeed unique in Europe. About thirty years ago a battle for frequencies
kicked o, with (analogue) broadcasters running to occupy frequencies as
fast as possible in order to claim part of the spectrum. This has lead to
a situation that has been dubbed \far west" by some commentators, who
point out that even national regulators struggle to get a clear picture of
actual assignment of broadcasting frequencies4.
This lack of an initially centralized approach to spectrum management in
the Italian broadcasting industry has generated two major market failures in
the era of analogue TV broadcasting. It has resulted in spectrum congestion
and harmful interference, and it has led to a duopoly where two companies|
Rai Radiotelevisione and Reti Televisive Italiane (Mediaset Group)|hold
together over 10.000 frequencies which represent 80% of total frequencies
currently available for analogue TV broadcasting nationwide (Agcom, 2006a,
para. 280).
In 1998, Agcom tried to step into the market by adopting the national
table of frequency allocation for analogue TV broadcasting5|something that
had been made in other European states many years earlier|but this regu-
lation was not implemented. Also, whereas other European regulators have
pursued provision of broadcast content by independent rms (e.g., in the UK,
France and Spain), vertical integration of network/frequency owners and con-
tent providers has been the dominant market structure in Italy, hence raising
antitrust concerns (Agcm, 2002, 2004, 2006; Adda and Ottavini, 2005).
These problematic features of TV broadcasting might have been tackled
by the advent of digital terrestrial TV (DTT). Digitization of signals allows
broadcasting of 4 to 6 TV programmes in the same spectrum swath where
analogue broadcast could only accommodate one single programme. Thus,
a TV programme that used one unit of allocated spectrum, with digital
4Agcom is trying to map the use of frequencies and build a database. Seemingly, there
are some 20.000 Italian TV bases that are not registered according to the international
regulations of Stockholm adopted in 1961.
5The table allocated 51 frequency channels (6 channels in band III VHF and 45 channels
in bands UHF IV and V). It also acknowledged 17 TV programmes, with 11 nationwide
broadcast programmes and 6 local broadcast programmes (Agcom, 2006a, para. 117-8).
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technology only needs a fraction of input6. Therefore, the remaining prime
spectrum, the so-called digital dividend, is potentially freed-up and can be
used to deliver additional programmes (the number depends on image reso-
lution and size, i.e. on the amount of information to be broadcast) or other
services (e.g. mobile communications, as well as unlicensed services). Hence,
new undertakings may access the digital dividend.
The European Commission, in its communication of May 24, 2005 on \ac-
celerating the transition from analogue to digital broadcasting" (EC, 2005b),
set out the Community policy objectives for the switchover. It identied
spectrum gains as one of the major advantages and claimed that \it will be
important to not constrain unduly the re-use of these bands for new and
innovative services" (p. 7), to provide the most value to society and the
economy. This is of particular relevance for those countries (such as Italy,
France, Spain and Greece) where terrestrial TV broadcasting has been the
dominant technology (whereas other countries, such as Germany, Belgium,
the Netherlands and Scandinavia have developed cable TV). Furthermore,
the Commission contended that the success of digital switchover will be en-
hanced by eective competition in digital broadcasting transmission services,
therefore advocating action by NRAs to ensure that undertakings with sig-
nicant market power in markets for digital broadcasting transmission are
subject to appropriate obligations.
Italy was quick in getting the transition started. This began with Law
no. 66 of 2001, which set the switch-o date for December 2006, although
at the end of December 2005 this deadline was delayed to 2008. Law no.
66 introduced broadcast infrastructure/frequency trading to allow tests of
digital switch-over, thus opening spectrum management to liberalisation. In
fact, frequency trading is still high on the European Commission's agenda
and only a few countries worldwide have introduced secondary trading of
frequencies over the last few years (e.g., the US, the UK, Germany, Australia
and Guatemala). Also, trading is permitted only in some frequency bands.
Law no. 66 was intended to promote digital switch-over in the frequen-
cies used for terrestrial TV, allowing the purchase of existing networks, or
parts thereof, by rms interested in starting o tests in digital transmissions.
6\If analogue TV broadcasting is switched to digital transmission [...] three to six times
less radio spectrum will be needed. This means that some 300 to 375 MHz of the current
amount allocated to terrestrial broadcasting could be freed and become newly available"
(EC, 2005b, p. 4).
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However, Law no. 66 restricted purchase of infrastructures/frequencies to
those broadcasters who already had authorisation to provide the same kind
of service, hence blocking entry for new competitors. Thereby, a second
\battle for frequencies" began, with incumbents buying out frequencies used
(or left idle) by analogue broadcasters (usually local ones), who are leaving
the market as the switch-o of analogue TV approaches, possibly because of
insucient nancial resources. According to national estimates reported by
Agcom (2006a, para. 182), the average cost for switching analogue plants to
digital transmission is likely to be in the range of e300K for those with great
area coverage. National operators have estimated that e30-40M is needed for
the deployment of a digital network (of 100-150 sites/frequencies) to broad-
cast digital terrestrial television in an area where 80% of the population is
able to receive the programmes7.
However, switch-o will not take place soon and Italy could still choose a
dierent regulatory path. For instance, it would be useful to map spectrum
usage in advance, in order to get information on spectrum usage before al-
lowing secondary trades. Also, much of the spectrum in nearby frequency
bands is held by the public sector, in particular by the Ministry of Defence.
Spectrum refarming may be negotiated between the Ministry of Communi-
cations and the Ministry of Defence, to facilitate digital switch-over in a way
similar to that adopted in the US by the FCC. Firstly, portions of spectrum
have been temporarily allocated to incumbent analogue broadcasters to carry
on their operations until migration to digital TV and, secondly, the digital
dividend will be auctioned o opening spectrum to new undertakings (Wik
Consult, 2005)8.
Law no. 249 of 1997 set at 20% the maximum amount of analogue net-
7ITMedia Consulting estimates the value of a frequency (i.e. a programme) that covers
95% of the population in the range of e240-270M, and an increase in the value per viewer
from e1 (at the introduction of frequency trading by Law no. 66) to e5; also, they argue
that some 25 multiplexes (i.e. 7 more than those included in Agcom's digital frequency
plan of 2003) can operate, thereby leading to a total estimation of DTT frequency of e6
billion (see Corriere della Sera, February 13, 2006).
8Some of the digital dividend will be used for public safety and particularly to facil-
itate inter-operability among public safety organisations. In some countries, regulators
are currently deciding how to re-allocate the digital dividend (e.g. Australia and New
Zealand). In addition, the UK is auctioning o spectrum, whereas in some other countries
frequencies are not scarce and, therefore, no options are being considered (e.g. Canada).
See Wik Consult (2005).
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works and programmes that could be broadcast by the same undertaking
using terrestrial frequencies. It also set an obligation for incumbents whose
operations exceeded such limit to migrate their operations to satellite and
cable|within a period of time to be decided by Agcom|in order to con-
form to the new antitrust limit. Thereby, spectrum could have been freed-up
and then made available during the migration from analogue to digital TV
(Agcm, 2002)9.
5.2 WiMax systems: how command-and-control regulation can
lag behind technological and market developments
WiMax oers a new wireless system standard with a wide range of possible
operating frequencies. WiMax can transmit signals up to 50 Km and has
greater throughput (hundreds of Mbps) compared to other wireless systems.
Hence, it supports a number of applications, including xed consumer and
business broadband, backhaul (e.g. for WiFi hotspots) and mobile data
services to handsets. Many deployment architectures are possible, but they
are primarily based on the same architecture as 2G/3G systems.
This new system is struggling to enter the Italian market, whereas in
other European countries (such as the Netherlands, Germany and Belgium)
as well as outside Europe WiMax has already been developed to provide both
business and household wireless services. In Europe, WiMax systems have
been developed to be able to operate in the frequency bands 3.4-3.6 GHz and
5.725-5.825 GHz, although the standard can be accommodated throughout
the frequency range between 2 and 11 GHz. In July 2005 the Italian Ministry
of Communications authorised WiMax tests in a number of Italian geographic
locations10, nally meeting manufacturers' repeated requests to be able to
run tests of systems implementing the new standard. Actually, for a few
years Agcom had been asking the Ministry of Communications to act in
order that the relevant swathes of spectrum|mainly held by the Ministry
of Defence for its own operations|were vacated. However, the Ministry
of Defence still controls those frequencies being used to test WiMax and,
meanwhile, the Ministry of Communications has delayed the deadline for
9It was also suggested to sell some of the spectrum controlled by the Ministry of Defence
to mobile operators, using these funds partly to compensate the Ministry and partly to
subsidize a migration of broadcasters` backhaul services from prime radio spectrum to
satellite and ber (Sole 24 ore, May 18, 2006).
10See http://wimax.fub.it/.
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those tests. Agcom has recently contended that this situation has become
unacceptable and has requested urgent action by the government (Agcom,
2006b, p. 9). At the end of December 2006, the Ministry of Communications
and the Ministry of Defence nally agreed on a plan whereby 2x35 MHz will
be available for WiMax in the 3.4-3.6 GHz band from June 2007. Also, the
two ministries agreed that twice as many frequencies will be allocated to
enable a nationwide spread of broadband services within ve years.
Vacating the spectrum where WiMax can operate is costly, as the Min-
istry of Defence will have to move its xed and mobile radar systems (as
well as other telecommunications equipment) to dierent sites and frequen-
cies11. The investments planned within the agreement will be nanced by the
State budget and perhaps also by revenues from commercialisation of WiMax.
Whereas WiFi is developed within the unlicensed spectrum, WiMax service
providers are looking for licensed spectrum to oer better service quality to
their customers, while lower quality|and cheaper|services could be oered
in unlicensed frequencies, probably those at 5.725-5.825 GHz. Moreover, the
Italian regulator will have to allocate radio bandwidth in order to change use
of the frequency bands currently occupied by the Ministry of Defence. In-
deed, European countries that pioneered commercial development of WiMax
systems are those where old licences (issued for mobile services, but left
unused and, sometimes, handed back to the regulator) could be re-used to
deploy WiMax networks. Flexibility in the use of spectrum is crucial.
5.3 Assignment of spectrum for mobile services: how to leave
valuable spectrum idle
The processes used to allocate frequencies for mobile services show how the
regulation of spectrum use by command-and-control can lead to delays in
the assignment of useful frequencies to market players. Delays are due to the
regulatory process governing spectrum management: this could be improved
if a more 
exible approach, based on private property of frequencies, were
introduced.
Firstly, at the end of 2005, 5 MHz of prime spectrum in the 900 MHz
band became available following switch-o of Tacs mobile phones. This small
amount of spectrum is in high demand because it enables better communi-
11There are also 20 MHz in the 1.8 GHz band that could be made available for electronic
communications, but, again, they need to be vacated by the Ministry of Defence.
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cations indoors and requires a lower number of antennas to cover the same
area.
Secondly, it was only at the beginning of 2006 that the Ministry of Com-
munications claimed back the frequencies that were assigned to the mobile
operator Ipse during the auction of Umts licences (Prat and Valletti, 2001).
Ipse had never used the 15 MHz of frequencies won in the auction. These 15
MHz of spectrum cost Ipse around e 3.3 billion. Ipse did not comply with its
contractual obligations and has sought, through the courts, to reduce those
obligations and thus avoid bankruptcy. Although attempts to re-assign these
frequencies to the other winners in the auction (Tim, Vodafone, Wind and
H3G) have been pursued by the government, negotiations among these mo-
bile operators failed.
Notwithstanding demand for these frequencies (as well as for those that
the Ministry of Defence is expected to vacate), the regulator are still in the
process of deciding how to re-assign frequencies (i.e. whether to choose a
beauty contest or an auction). Meanwhile, valuable spectrum has been left
idle.
6 Alternatives to command-and-control regulation, or, why a mar-
ket regime should be preferred to a commons regime
Reform of the approach to spectrum management is opposed by embedded
interests, particularly those of incumbent rms providing spectrum-based
services, as well as those of regulators (whose role would be diminished by
either a commons or a market regime). The literature, however, suggests
that command-and-control regulation, as currently conceived, is defective
and that a change in spectrum regulation is urgently needed12.
There is considerable disagreement on the direction that spectrum reform
should follow and the development of a viable spectrum management regime,
as an alternative to command and control, is still at an early stage. In its
review of EU regulatory framework for electronic communications networks
and services, the European Commission has stated that:
\a new system for spectrum management is needed that permits
12See, for example, Coase (1959), Noam (1998), Hazlett (1998), Benkler (2002), Cave
(2002), FCC (2002), Faulhaber and Farber (2002), Kwerel and Williams (2002), Benjamin
(2003), Faulhaber (2005), EC (2005b), Ofcom (2005a) and Baumol and Robyn (2006).
Agcom (2006b) advances a plea for a change of spectrum regulation in Italy.
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dierent models of spectrum licensing (the traditional administra-
tive, unlicensed and new marked-based approaches) to coexist so
as to promote economic and technical eciency in the use of this
valuable resource. Based on common EU rules, greater 
exibility
in spectrum management could be introduced by strengthening the
use of general authorisations whenever possible" (EC, 2006, p. 7).
Whether a new spectrum strategy should be guided by market mecha-
nisms or by the commons paradigm has been a controversial issue for many
years, in particular in the US. In early stages of this controversy, there was
clear opposition between free-market economists, who supported the intro-
duction of wide-spread market mechanisms, and, usually, legal scholars and
technology experts, who supported the commons formula (Faulhaber, 2002).
Economists, like Ronald Coase, favoured placing all licences into the market,
permitting both private and public licensees to buy, sell, trade, aggregate,
and disaggregate spectrum rights, unfettered by government-imposed use
restrictions. The lawyers and the engineers pointed to new wireless technolo-
gies and argued for a commons regime in spectrum with no property rights
(Faulhaber, 2006, p. 539).
Recently, the con
ict between these two views has waned and the idea
has been advanced that both market mechanisms and commons regimes can
prove useful in the design of a renewed approach to spectrum management.
Considerable dierences still remain regarding what should be the right mix
of the two. Some believe that regulation should move towards more 
exi-
bility by reliance on market mechanisms, with forms of (private) commons
regimes for parts of the spectrum (Ofcom, 2005a; Baumol and Robyn, 2006;
Cave, 2006; Faulhaber, 2006). Others believe that spectrum management
should be based on a commons approach (with open access), with individual
and exclusive rights used only in specic instances (Benkler, 2002; Werbach,
2004).
Technological advances have been referred to by students in the latter
group to promote their case for a commons-based approach. Developments
in spread spectrum technologies (which allow higher levels of spectrum usage
by transmitting over a much wider range of frequencies compared with older
technologies), the fast growth of WiFi applications (which provide wireless
broadband access to data networks) and the promise of cognitive radio (with
the capability to sense the surrounding environment and intelligently select
the appropriate behaviour) have been used to argue against licensed spec-
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trum and market mechanisms as the basic ingredients of a new approach to
substitute for command-and-control regulation.
However, arguments against a spectrum commons regime can also be
found. Spread spectrum technologies are often underlay techniques13 oper-
ating across licensed bands and enabling operations by secondary users on a
no-harm interference basis; WiMax applications, which may be regarded as
advanced WiFi ones (enabling faster connections over longer distances), are
being developed within a framework of exclusive use of frequencies14. Also,
the promise of cognitive radio is still a long way in the future and it is far
from clear how self-coordination of complex independent devices will actually
take place in a spectrum commons.
In the future, technological development may bring marketable devices
that can intelligently organize communications among them and thus use
the spectrum without causing too much reciprocal interference. However,
this scenario is far from feasible with current hardware and software. In-
deed, advocates of a commons regime approach (with open access to the
whole spectrum) have not yet provided a viable solution to the problem of
coordination which must be solved to avoid harmful interference. Reliance
on development of social norms suggested by game theory is, according to
Faulhaber (2005, p. 30), \romantic but fanciful". Contributions from game
theory assume stable communities in which actions among players are part
of the pattern of a repeated game15. In wireless communications, a multi-
tude of users might transmit in the same frequencies and mobility is crucial;
few homogeneous groups can be seen as players in a repeated game (e.g.
amateur radio operators)|so cooperation is unlikely to occur. Moreover,
Mahoney and Sanchirico (2003) suggest that, if the cooperative equilibria
13Spectrum underlay techniques seek coexistence between two or more users of the same
channel (or spectrum swath) by enabling transmissions with very low power by secondary
users that will not interfere with systems with higher power densities deployed by a primary
user. Spectrum overlay techniques are based on an intrude-and-avoid principle such that
a secondary user transmits signals only when the channel is not occupied by the primary
user.
14Notably, WiFi networks utilize unlicensed frequencies. However, access is usually
limited to authorized persons or provided to users who pay for access to the network over
an agreed period of time (e.g. one month). Advocates of a commons argue that spectrum
should be open to anyone. However, one thing is an access regime, and another thing is a
property regime.
15See, for example, Eatwell et al., eds. (1989), Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) and Osborne
(2004).
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would require investments, it is likely that they will be unstable compared
to non-cooperative equilibria16.
Nevertheless, the concept of a commons regime is not to be rejected alto-
gether. Actually, whereas a commons regime could not take over spectrum
management using the command-and-control formula and perform better,
parts of the spectrum may be used as a commons with a coordination mech-
anism provided by a central authority, such as a band manager, similar to,
for example, WiFi. Indeed, the main drawbacks from the commons ap-
proach arise due to a confusion being made between a property regime (com-
mons) and an access regime (Hazlett, 2006). It is open (unregulated) access
to valuable (scarce) spectrum that would lead to what has been called|
paraphrasing Garrett Hardin's tragedy of the commons|a spectrum tragedy
(Hazlett, 2005). In that situation, too many users seeking access to the same
resource would eventually end up causing harmful interference and blocking
transmissions altogether. Open access would bring about exactly what the
introduction of spectrum regulation intended to avoid and control for: chaos
in the ether (Coase, 1959; Hazlett, 2001). Ultimately, open access implies
that spectrum belongs to nobody and is also beyond end-state regulation:
\open access regimes re
ect the unwillingness or inability of the
government, society or current users to introduce and enforce an
eective system of control that determines the total number of
users and regulates the behaviour of insiders. Two functions that
all systems of property rights share, exclusion and governance, are
missing from open access regimes. When exclusion and governance
are absent, economic agents lack the incentive to economize in the
use of resources, maintain their quality, and invest in their improve-
ment. In marginal cases, such behaviour is economically ecient,
namely when the costs of eective exclusion and governance are
high relative to the value of resource units" (Eggersson, 2003, pp.
85-6).
As argued above, spectrum|and particularly frequencies in high demand|
cannot be regarded as one of the marginal cases where open access may be
justied on economic grounds. A commons regime has an owner (or is owned
by a group); therefore open access and chaos can be avoided, since it will be
16See Faulhaber (2005, p. 30) for details on this argument based on contributions from
game theory.
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for the owners to regulate use of their resource in order to avoid ineciencies
(Ostrom, 1990). Indeed, spectrum governed by a commons regime can be
allocated by market forces: the owner(s)|both private and public|can buy,
sell, trade, aggregate and disaggregate their spectrum.
And whereas Kwerel and Williams (2002), in their plea for the use of mar-
ket mechanisms, suggested a big-bang auction of all spectrum, advocates of
an open access regime have not suggested how to abandon current command-
and-control regulation and move to their envisioned scenario. Thereby, al-
though there are ways to move forward in regulating spectrum more e-
ciently within the property rights paradigm, no such pragmatic guidance has
emerged with regard to other paradigms.
A phased approach towards a spectrum management regime based on
exclusive property rights seems a more viable option (Ofcom, 2005a; Cave,
2006). Until a systematic approach to spectrum strategy is implemented
(preferably, as maintained above, a property rights regime), ineciencies in
spectrum management are likely to persist.
7 Towards a new spectrum strategy
In the past, relatively slow technological change and relatively abundant spec-
trum availability combined to mitigate any command-and-control regulation
ineciencies. Over the years, regulators have tried to cope with (increas-
ing) technological change and (booming) demand in wireless communications
by adjusting, piecemeal, frequency allocation17. They have also established
procedures to change spectrum assignment, usually involving vacation of
frequencies operated by the previous user and subsequent re-assignment to
another user, by means of either a \rst-come, rst-served" procedure, a
\beauty contest", or even a lottery, which, paradoxically, in trying to get rid
of regulatory discretion in the allocation of frequencies, results in the most
inecient outcome.
17In Europe, the Radio Spectrum Policy Group (RSPG), which advises the European
Commission, is pursuing a more unied regulatory regime. In particular, the RSPG is
elaborating on the concept of Wireless Access Policy (formerly Platforms) for Electronic
Communications Services (WAPECS). Notably, WAPECS aims to introduce more 
exi-
bility in the use of radio frequency spectrum, taking into account that, presently, dierent
platforms and technologies may provide mobile, portable and xed access for a wide range
of electronic communications services, including converging applications (RSPG, 2005).
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Auctions were rst advocated by Coase in 1959 and were immediately re-
bued by the FCC as a \big joke", but they were eventually espoused by reg-
ulators fteen years ago (Hazlett, 2001); so command-and-control regulation
has used market mechanisms for primary assignment of radio frequencies.
Some regulators have also introduced frequency trading, e.g. the UK
and Australia, hence allowing the market to move spectrum from one user to
another. However, spectrum trading, without liberalization of frequency use,
does not solve the problem of regulatory misallocation of frequencies (Valletti,
2001; Hazlett, 2003; Analysys et al., 2004). Moreover, in those countries
where licences can be traded, only a limited number of trades has taken
place, often among rms under the same parent company (Wik Consult,
2005)18.
More recently, the promises (as well as the challenges) of new and emerg-
ing technologies, which enable novel and more intensive ways to share spec-
trum among users, have suggested to allow more 
exible arrangements in
spectrum management. In the US, \easements" have been suggested (Faul-
haber and Farber, 2002) to enable secondary users to transmit in the frequen-
cies of a licensed user, provided that the latter do not suer any harmful inter-
ference. Easements might be useful for applications based on ultra-wideband
technology (which transmits below the noise 
oor) or for those spectrum-
based services that do not require time-continuous availability of frequencies
(e.g. data-intensive applications). While spectrum easements might be eas-
ily introduced (either by simply modifying existing licences or by re-issuing
them), they might also accommodate the open access advocates' proposal
for spectrum resources (Faulhaber, 2005): this novel arrangement would be
very much crafted in the existing framework of command-and-control, but it
is unclear how \a governmental rule without price and prot incentives will
be able to match the performance of a market regime" (Baumol and Robyn,
2006, p. 62).
To develop a full-
edged (secondary) market, both proposals would need
regulation to properly dene and allocate spectrum usage rights. Regulators
18A number of reasons may be given for the generally low level of trading experienced
internationally: for instance, scarce public information about spectrum use (in particu-
lar, price information), lack of consistency of licence terms and conditions, availability of
unused spectrum, large programmes of primary awards, uncertainties due to phased liber-
alisation of spectrum use and likely modications of spectrum usage rights by regulatory
at.
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have two main options. The rst option would be to re-issue all existing li-
cences, by transforming them into spectrum property rights designed around
a few crucial features of spectrum usage, and then letting Coasian bargaining
nd the optimal conguration of such rights. This option would favour the
status quo and likely save on transaction costs (Ercole, 2005). The second
option would be a more radical change to a property rights regime, where all
licences are withdrawn and entitlements to the same bundle of property rights
(i.e. spectrum usage features) are granted to all previous licensees. However,
this would present redistribution issues (Kwerel and Williams, 2002). More-
over, transaction costs to adjust the \one-does-not-t-all" bundle of rights
(initially issued by the regulator) are likely to be very high and even block
bargaining. Hence, the initial decision on the conguration of spectrum usage
rights is crucial and regulators would have to design an appropriate bundle
of rights (Cave and Webb, 2003b).
A few regulators|particularly in Australia and the UK|have taken sig-
nicant steps in this direction. Broadly, in order to manage interference with
a minimum amount of regulation19, the new licences would set the maximum
transmission power, the maximum adjacent channel (or out-of-band) inter-
ference and the maximum out-of-area interference (Cave and Webb, 2003b).
A similar approach is being pursued in the UK by Ofcom, which, in drawing
up spectrum usage rights, is considering three main types of interferences,
i.e. geographical interference, out-of-band interference and in-band interfer-
ence (Ofcom, 2006). Thus, instead of specifying technical restrictions on
spectrum use to protect neighbouring users against harmful interference in-
directly, such alternative approach aims to directly specify the emissions that
a licence holder may transmit in neighbouring bands or locations. According
to Ofcom, \this could bring two key advantages: 1) licensees would have
greater 
exibility since their licences would not restrict the technology or
application; 2) neighbouring licence holders would have more clarity over the
levels of emissions from neighbours they can expect" (Ofcom, 2006, pp. 3-4).
In Australia, spectrum property rights have already been introduced success-
19The design of more 
exible (and tradable) spectrum usage rights involves also other
issues: in particular, national regulators seem reluctant to introduce perpetual usage rights
and insist that they should decide the appropriate duration of such rights. In the UK, the
recommendation to introduce perpetuity of rights, made in a recent ocial report (Cave,
2002), has not been followed, and Ofcom can withdraw licences after a certain number of
years has elapsed.
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fully (PC, 2002) and few issues of interference among users have arisen (Wik
Consult, 2005). However, some users have contended that regulators tend to
grant spectrum rights to particular applications, thereby failing to meet ser-
vice neutrality: those users advocate further 
exibility to change the current
arrangement. The US has recently adopted a technology-neutral approach in
the aftermath of the Spectrum policy task force report, but there are often
problems with radio interference when new technologies are introduced.
8 Administrative incentive pricing
The design and implementation of a new spectrum management regime is
likely to take considerable time, irrespective of whether reviews of spectrum
strategy favour a commons or a full-
edged market regime (EC, 2006). How-
ever, there are ways to promote ecient spectrum use by relying on a hybrid
solution, i.e. administrative incentive pricing (AIP), which adopts a market
approach and may be quickly introduced. AIP is an incentive based pricing
technique built on the principle that any use of spectrum imposes an oppor-
tunity cost on society|the value foregone of alternative use. The aim of AIP
is to ensure that spectrum holders fully recognize this when making decisions
on spectrum holdings or acquisitions.
8.1 Spectrum charges and administrative incentive pricing
AIP is based upon identifying the economic value of radio spectrum. Admin-
istrative spectrum pricing methodologies attempt to reproduce the market
clearing price (CEPT, 1999). The underlying rationale is that, in the absence
of a well functioning market for spectrum, AIP will try to re
ect the oppor-
tunity cost. This should help ensure that spectrum 
ows from low to high
value uses. Also, as the objective is to price scarce spectrum close to market
levels, periodic AIP adjustments would take account of changing scarcities
(Cave et al., 2007).
In a study for Ofcom, Indepen et al. (2004) suggest that, in deciding
whether there are opportunity costs associated with the frequency bands
and radio services, the following tests should be applied:
- is there excess demand for spectrum now or will there be in the near
future from existing uses?
- can the spectrum be used for another purpose and, if so, is there excess
demand from other uses?
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- is it practical or feasible to collect AIP fees given possible constraints
due to avoidance or illegal use?
- are there any policies or political factors that impede the use of AIP?
In cases where AIP is not appropriate|because the marginal opportu-
nity cost of spectrum is zero|license fees should be set only to re
ect the
spectrum management and enforcement costs caused by each service. There-
fore, regulators have adopted dierent nancing schemes, classied into four
groups: a) a fee-based model; b) a state-nanced model; c) a charge-based
model with or without a cost-allocation system; and d) hybrid fee and charge-
based models (CEPT, 2004).
A comparison of the frequency usage fee structures in dierent countries
has revealed that some of the following features are generally considered by
regulators (Yu et al., 2004): frequency bandwidth, emission power, coverage
area, frequency band, dedicated use vs. shared use, time of use, transmit vs.
receive-only use, application/service type, supply vs. demand, and special
purpose. For instance, in Korea, frequency usage fees are calculated based
on a formulation that includes bandwidth, frequency band, (non-) shared use
and type of service. In Australia, relevant parameters are bandwidth, area
of coverage, geographic and spectrum location. Ofcom (2005b) has recently
identied a number of common principles to apply in setting taris for license
fees and administrative charges: a) use of turnover as a common tari basis
across all sectors or the setting of xed taris where applicable; b) collection
of turnover data for the last but one calendar year; c) implementation of
administrative charges and license fees for each regulatory sector and for each
regulatory category within the regulatory sector. This will ensure reduced
fees for regulatory categories with lower regulatory costs. Last, but not least,
taris for some categories, where turnover data is inappropriate, may be set
as xed cash sums.
8.2 How to set AIP
In the United Kingdom, a study conducted for the Radiocommunications
Agency by Nera and Smith System Engineering (Smith-Nera, 1996) proposed
a methodology to introduce administrative prices that re
ect the marginal
opportunity cost imposed on society by the use of spectrum resources. This
method relied on estimating the change in an operator's costs according to
the amount of spectrum that could be used. For example, a GSM operator
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might need spectrum to increase its capacity in certain urban and suburban
areas. It could either do this by having more spectrum, or perhaps reducing
cell sizes, or going to half rate codecs. The model would thus attempt to
estimate the dierence in costs of having extra spectrum, or spending more
on infrastructure. This was then rened by the British regulator, which
introduced modiers for the type of land area where the spectrum was used
(urban, suburban or rural). However, most of the cost was biased towards
the areas where spectrum was scarce (Indepen et al., 2004).
This approach was later developed to tackle emerging issues, such as
working out the marginal private value for spectrum in a number of likely
uses (and not just one). For example, it might be that a given piece of
spectrum could be used for PMR, GSM, or xed links. Thus a marginal
value could be calculated based on those three services. It is also possible to
calculate the marginal value of using alternative pieces of spectrum for the
same service, e.g. GSM use at 900 MHz or 450 MHz. This would then give
a table of values that might show that the current use does not provide the
highest value. It would then be for the regulator to decide how to set a price
to encourage ecient allocation20.
However, there may be instances where a piece of spectrum used for
service A cannot be changed to a higher value service B (even if service B
caused no more interference than service A) for reasons that are beyond a
spectrum user's ability to change (for example, international regulation, or
the lack of availability of equipment in suitable volumes or prices). Thus it
would not make sense to charge users, in a given frequency band, at an AIP
level for a higher value service.
A further renement is to ask the question of what happens if the amount
of spectrum can not be altered gradually, whilst keeping the same output.
For example in analogue TV broadcasting in Europe, an 8 MHz channel is
required at a minimum. It may not be possible to use extra infrastructure to
reduce this (perhaps because of public service requirements on such broad-
casters). In such circumstances it might be required to use a marginal prot
analysis. This requires more information to model costs and consumer de-
mand. This then is a full blown modeling exercise to calculate the net present
value and this would reveal likely spectrum bid value at auction.
20The aforementioned work by Indepen et al. (2004) suggested that the price be set
towards the lower end of the valuations between the higher and lower value services. This
would then help to encourage spectrum to 
ow from low to high value uses.
23F. Minervini, D. Piacentino / WP n.7 DiSSE, University of Macerata
Other enhancements have also been suggested, such as working out the
average between the impact of having more and less spectrum. For example,
if one MHz were to be taken from a Public Access Mobile Radio (PAMR)
provider, the dierence in extra equipment costs might be e100,000. If such
a PAMR operator were given an extra one MHz, this might have a value of
only e50,000. Thus the ecient AIP could be set at the average of e100K
and e50K (i.e. e75K).
More crucially, the value that emerges from any AIP calculation is highly
dependent on what amounts of spectrum are chosen for the start and end
points of the analysis. This is because the value of spectrum for a network
operator will follow a diminishing marginal value law: for example, a GSM
operator with 2x5 MHz of spectrum is likely to value an extra 2x5 MHz very
highly, compared to an operator with 2x20 MHz (who is likely to value such
an amount of extra spectrum far less)21. AIP is also highly sensitive to the
start and end conditions chosen, as well as what services are assumed to be
allowed in a given frequency band. Thus, without a detailed understanding
of these issues, it might be that the values derived from an AIP calculation
could vary wildly.
8.3 AIP and the impact of spectrum on costs
The following table gives an example of the calculation of AIP, based on
the Smith-Nera method. The calculation is highly dependent on the initial
assumptions chosen, such as discount rates and re-use patterns, as well as
the change in spectrum taken into account. In this case it is 2x3 MHz, which
requires an extra radio transceiver to be placed at each cell site. This means
that in urban areas the cell sizes can increase, and hence the number of sites
decreases by 84. The reduction in the costs associated with these 84 sites is
the upside of the AIP calculation. The downside is the extra costs of more
radio transceivers.
The table shows, on the one hand, the savings from having 84 fewer sites
(which is possible from having an extra 2x3 MHz) and, on the other hand, the
additional costs of buying more transceivers. There will be a cost associated
with installing these extra transceivers, but it is assumed here the cost is
21At some point, an operator will nd that the marginal value of extra spectrum is zero.
However, AIP should not be used if it helps an operator with signicant market power
increase its market power.
24F. Minervini, D. Piacentino / WP n.7 DiSSE, University of Macerata
small as aerials normally have extra ports available, and that maintenance
cost covers the extra site visits required (to install the extra racks).
The gures arrived at are:
Savings from Capital e6,720,000
84 fewer sites Annual e1,512,000
Costs of more Capital e2,520,000




The capital gure is annualized over 10 years and this gives an annual
fee of e663,691 (based on a 12% discount rate). This gure is added to the
annual saving of e1,260,000, to give a total annual AIP charge of e1,923,691.
This is the fee for 2x3 MHz of spectrum and, with fteen 2x200 kHz GSM
channels, this equates to a fee of e128,246 each.
8.4 Fit for purpose
AIP has already been applied in the United Kingdom since 1998 (and has
generally become more sophisticated). A few countries in the process of re-
viewing overall spectrum pricing policy are considering incentive based spec-
trum pricing to encourage ecient spectrum use (e.g. Denmark, Canada,
India, Singapore and Japan). The level of complexity and detail, that is re-
quired in any AIP scheme, depends on the policy objectives and on the local
market situation. For instance, Australia and New Zealand have allowed for
a system of spectrum pricing that embodies in part the principle of opportu-
nity costs, but because neither country is experiencing signicant spectrum
scarcity or congestion, it has only been applied to a limited extent within an
overall cost recovery framework (ACMA, 2006b).
A possible argument against spectrum pricing, in particular amongst pub-
lic sector users, is that spectrum pricing would simply lead to a recycling of
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funds between dierent branches of government. However, Cave (2002) con-
tended that even if the public sector user were to be fully compensated for
their spectrum use, then it would still have incentives to reduce usage of
spectrum and use the funds made available for other purposes.
9 Conclusions
Evidence suggests that command-and-control regulation is no longer a suit-
able arrangement for spectrum management. Rapid technological develop-
ment and booming demand for spectrum-based services have made apparent
the limits of current regulations, which, even if they might have been useful
in the past, do not provide a framework for ecient use of spectrum resources
anymore. Indeed, spectrum use should be characterized by a (much) higher
degree of 
exibility.
However, demise of the formula of command and control is unlikely to
happen suddenly: the traditional approach to spectrum management cannot
abruptly be replaced by either a commons regime or a property rights regime,
because there are several issues that need to be addressed by regulators, in
order to gradually move to a more 
exible and eective regime.
This transition should favour market mechanisms and, in particular, it
should be implemented by designing spectrum usage rights. Thus, spectrum
would be treated like any other input (which users can, for instance, buy,
sell or lease) and a full-
edged market could then develop. This implies
the withdrawal of regulation from practices aimed at coping with contin-
gencies and withdrawal from the issuing of licences that, in an attempt to
(allegedly) avoid harmful interference and to protect the operations of in-
cumbent spectrum users, have caused ineciencies and articial scarcity of
spectrum resources.
While the discussion about the introduction and development of a new
regime is on-going, market-based mechanisms to spectrum management might
be rapidly adopted. These would not only provide immediate incentives for
a more ecient use of spectrum resources, but could smooth the transition
to a new market-based regime for spectrum management. In particular,
the introduction of administrative incentive pricing for those parts of the
spectrum|i.e. the majority|where market mechanisms are not in place
(for allocation or for assignment) could reduce current ineciencies in spec-
trum management. However, only a full-
edged market regime, implemented
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in ways that will minimize transaction costs, is likely to bring about gains,
particularly by enabling ecient re-allocation of frequencies.
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